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Abstract
This paper presents an integrated view of economic growth, development traps, and
economic geography. We explain why there is income convergence among some coun-
tries (neoclassical regime) and income divergence among others (poverty trap regime).
Income convergence (divergence) and manufacturing industry di¤usion (agglomera-
tion) are re-enforcing each other in a cumulative process. Moreover, trade openness
may trigger a catch-up process of an economy that is stuck in a “poverty trap”. This
catch-up is characterized by an increase in the investment-to-GDP ratio and an im-
provement of the terms of trade. A new dynamic welfare gain of trade liberalization
is identi…ed, which is likely to be large.
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apply.1 Introduction
“... many people still vaguely believe that manufacturing somehow matters more than
any other economic activity; ... Manufacturing, in this way of looking at things, brings
more growth, better-paid jobs, fatter export earnings and greater technological progress
than any other economic activity.” (Carson, 1998, p. 2)
Manufacturing activity is special, because it is more likely to be characterized
by increasing returns to scale technology than many other economic activities (Kaldor,
1967). However, increasing returns to scale di¤ers from constant returns to scale tech-
nology in the general equilibrium outcome. Increasing returns to scale helps explain
intra-industry trade (Krugman, 1979, 1980), agglomeration of manufacturing indus-
tries (Krugman, 1991a), specialization without comparative advantage or endowment
di¤erences (Krugman and Venables, 1995, 1996), sustained growth (Romer, 1986), big
push (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989), among many others.1
These implications of increasing returns to scale technology are also interrelated
among each other. For example, Baldwin and Forslid (1998) argue: “It is a pervasive
fact that industrial agglomeration and growth are closely linked...” (p. 701) Empir-
ically, this interrelation has been clearly demonstrated by Gallup and Sachs (1998).
Theoretically, there have recently been a number of endogenous growth models which
are merged with economic geography models or industrialization models. Chen and
Shimomura (1998) analyze industrialization by technology adoption in the presence of
learning externalities. Wong and Yip (1998) look at specialization patterns in manu-
facturing and agriculture and its welfare implications, if manufacturing also involves
a learning externality. Local inputs with scale economies have been integrated into a
two-country exogenous growth model by Faini (1984) and into an endogenous growth
model by Englmann and Walz (1995). Walz (1998) considers economic integration
by a new country entering a trade-bloc in a geography and growth model. Kelly
1An extensive account of the implications of increasing returns is given in Buchanan and Yoon
(1994).
1(1997) argues that trade liberalization may trigger a process of growth take-o¤ yield-
ing agglomeration (and growth) clusters in an intermediate stage as more and more
infrastructure investments bind together ever larger areas of clusters. Martin and Ot-
taviano (1999) show the impact of the degree of agglomeration on the growth rate of
the economy in the presence of local and global information spillovers. Martin and
Ottaviano (1996) explore the circular causality between R&D lab location decisions
and manufacturing industry location decisions. Baldwin (1999) explores the impact
of Krugman’s (1980) home market e¤ect on Tobin’s q and knowledge capital accumu-
lation. Baldwin, Martin, and Ottaviano (1998) provide a synthesis of R&D spillover
e¤ects and home market e¤ect that is used to explain di¤erent stages of development.
These endogenous growth models are well suited to explain geographic poverty traps,
trade related barriers to industrialization, and the lack of R&D and manufacturing in
LDCs in a North-South world.
Instead, we would like to focus on a North-North world with similar countries
to explore two types of phenomena: 1) the fall-back of a developed country relative to
others, and 2) the impact of trade liberalization on the convergence or divergence of
income across two countries. Occassionally, some well-developed countries appear to
fall behind and this process is related to manufacturing. For example, there exists a
large literature on the decline of British manufacturing up to the end of the 70ies.2 In
this case, a country may not loose its entire manufacturing sector as is the eventual
outcome of most endogenous growth models, but may end up with a lower growth
performance in manufacturing output than other countries.3 Also, physical capital
accumulation may play a dominant role relative to human capital and R&D.4 Even-
tually, it may be more interesting to study a smooth transition path towards a new
steady state in the fall-back process, rather than considering a “catastrophic jump”
2See, for example, Edgerton (1996), Kitson and Michie (1996), and Bean and Crafts (1995) to
just mention a few.
3Kitson and Michie (1996) show that average annual manufacturing output grew 1.5 % in the UK
in comparison to 3.9 % in the US or 2.7 % in Germany in the period from 1964 until 1989.
4For the British decline, this has been demonstrated in Bean and Crafts (1995) using Levine and
Renelts (1992) growth regression results. A shortage of physical capital accumulation accounts for
0.55 percentage points of a total of a 1.63 % annual UK growth rate shortfall compared to a mere
0.08 percentage points explained by a lack of education (human capital). However, there is some
evidence that a lack of R&D also plaid an important role (see Edgerton, 1996).
2in the growth rate, which is of interest in the LDC case. All these arguments indicate
that the study of a neoclassical growth and geography model is empirically useful.
The study of the impact of trade liberalization on income convergence of de-
veloped countries also requires a deviation from the existing models. Trade liberal-
ization causes income divergence in geography and growth models5, but empirically,
income convergence has been found in the European integration process or the North-
American trade liberalization process (Ben-David, 1993), whereas trade liberalization
of LDCs may have quite the opposite implication (see Rauch, 1997, for some exam-
ples). Also, the convergence process triggered by trade liberalization peters out after
a while (Ben-David, 1993). Hence, the transition path to the new steady states af-
ter trade liberalization is more important than the study of the change of the steady
state growth rate. Again, this points at the usefulness of a neoclassical growth and
geography model.
To capture the above stylized facts in a North-North world, we merge a 2-
country neoclassical growth model with an economic geography model. The country
that grows stronger improves its relative producer prices (terms of trade) because of
the home-market e¤ect (Krugman, 1980). The savings and investment decision in
each country is based on the present and future real interest rate which is equal to
the real rental rate of capital. The real rental rate in each country at a given point in
time is in‡uenced by three e¤ects: (i) The higher producer prices in the larger country
allow ceteris paribus for higher rental rates (agglomeration force I). (ii) Because trade
cost are lower in the larger country (proximity to production cluster), there is cheaper
access to the consumption basket in the larger country. Hence, the consumption price
index is lower in the larger country. This means - everything else equal - that the
real interest rate is higher in the larger country (agglomeration force II). (iii) The
capital-labor ratio is higher in the larger country. By capital-labour substitutability,
this implies a higher wage-rental rate in the larger country (convergence force). The
5An exception is Walz (1998). However, trade integration is di¤erently de…ned by the entrance of
a new country into a trading-bloc.
3net e¤ect of the three forces turns out to be ambiguous and depends on the level of
trade costs.
If trade costs are su¢ciently large (poverty trap regime), then the real rental
rate of capital of the larger country is larger than of the smaller one which induces even
more capital accumulation in the larger country relative to the smaller one (comple-
mentarity of investment projects). Income is diverging and the smaller country su¤ers
from lower welfare. If trade costs are small (neoclassical regime), then the real rental
rate of capital is larger in the smaller country and the smaller country accumulates
more capital (substitutability of investment projects). Income converges among the
two countries.
Our …rst contribution will be to focus on a new agglomeration process of manu-
facturing industries among countries that is based on a mutual interaction with physi-
cal capital accumulation and growth. Agglomeration of economic activity on di¤erent
levels like city, region, or nation may be explained by di¤erent agglomeration forces.6
Cities may be formed by localized intermediate inputs (Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita
(1988), Rivera-Batiz (1988), and in a growth setting Englmann and Walz (1995)).
Disparities among regions may be caused by factor movements such as worker mi-
gration (Krugman, 1991a), or forward and backward linkages caused by intermediate
goods (Venables, 1996). Internationally, frictionless factor movements are less likely
to happen than interregionally.7 What causes thus an unequal distribution of man-
ufacturing industries among countries? One answer is specialization of countries in
di¤erent sectors (e.g. Krugman and Venables, 1995); another one is information exter-
nalities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991); and a third answer is R&D location decisions
(Martin and Ottaviano, 1996). The simplest explanation is, however, that there are
more manufacturing …rms in one country relative to another, because this country has
accumulated more physical capital. This alone does not su¢ce for an explanation. The
missing part is how …rm agglomeration feeds back on diverging capital accumulation.
6Fujita and Thisse (1996) survey the literature on agglomeration economics. We consider only
endogenous explanations in cumulative processes, such that completely identical countries end up
diverging from each other if there is just a small disturbance (idiosyncratic shock).
7See Krugman and Venables (1995).
4How does an increase of agglomeration lead to higher growth of a country relative
to another, and higher growth to even higher …rm agglomeration? We explain this
feed-back with a terms-of-trade e¤ect. In our model, the country that grows faster
improves its terms of trade. In contrast, the terms of trade remain constant in other
geography and trade models. In other dynamic trade models - such as Osang and
Pereira (1997) - the terms of trade deteriorate, if a country grows faster than another.
Our second contribution will be to explain how trade-liberalization triggers a
catch-up process. It is obvious that the agglomeration forces depend crucially on the
costs of bridging distances (e.g. transport cost, tari¤s, information costs, etc.), be-
cause otherwise location does not matter. If agglomeration happens at a high level
of trade costs and convergence at a low level, and manufacturing agglomeration or
convergence feed back on growth, then we have established a (new) nexus between
trade-liberalization and growth. This role of trade cost is in contrast to the typi-
cal economic geography models8, but …ts the stylized facts of Ben-David (1993) for
developed countries.
Our third contribution will be to show that a country that is about to become
stuck in a poverty trap can improve its welfare, if bilateral trade costs are reduced
su¢ciently. The latter constitutes a new source of dynamic welfare gains of trade
liberalization beyond those demonstrated in Baldwin (1992). This source of a dynamic
welfare gain of trade is likely to be large, because trade liberalization may trigger a
(non-marginal) change of the entire time trajectory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives the formal model
set-up; section 3 solves the model for the steady states; section 4 provides a stability
analysis; section 4.1 discusses the neoclassical growth regime; section 4.2 discusses
the “poverty trap” regime; section 4.3 discusses the model implications for economic
geography; section 5 analyzes the welfare implications and identi…es a new source of
dynamic gains of trade from trade liberalization; section 6 concludes.
8An exception is Puga (1999). However, this model is not a growth model and the reason for
this e¤ect is not capital-labour substitutability of manufacturing technology - as in this paper - but
land-labour substitutability of a perfectly competitive, constant returns to scale sector.
52 The Model Set-up
There are two consumers which di¤er only by their place of residence in two countries
(j = 1;2). A standard logarithmic intertemporal utility function9 Uj is assumed that






where ¸ is the time preference rate, and t is a time index in continuous time.10 The
consumption basket Cj of a consumer j is of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type and is
de…ned on all domestic and foreign produced varieties with an elasticity of substitution
















where cij is consumer j’s demand for variety i, N is the set of all domestically and
foreign produced varieties, n1is the number of varieties in country 1, and n2 is the
number of varieties in country 2. Additionally, there is no international borrowing
and lending and trade will have to be balanced.11
With monopolistic competition, each variety i will be produced by a di¤erent
…rm i. Firms di¤er only by their location. Therefore, …rms within a country j are
symmetric and the index i for …rm i in country j can be collapsed to j denoting a
typical …rm in country j:
The production technology is a Cobb-Douglas production function with …xed
cost that gives rise to increasing returns to scale on plant level. In particular, ® units
of inputs vj in form of a basket of labour lj and capital kj are used to install the
9All results of this paper would also hold, if an iso-elastic utility function were used. But some
proofs would become substantially more complicated.
10We suppress the time index whenever obvious.
11The assumption of balanced trade has a long tradition in the trade and growth literature: e.g.
Stiglitz (1970), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Ventura (1997).
6production process every day (maintenance work) and ¯ units of the input basket are
used to produce each unit of goods for the domestic and the foreign market xj:





where ± (0 < ± < 1) denotes the income share of capital.12
We assume as in Baldwin, Forslid and Haaland (1995) that investment and
capital are the same composite of industrial goods as consumption and consumption


















where Ij is the investment aggregate used by the …rms in country j to increase the
capital stock Kj of country j, a dot denotes the time derivative of a variable, and ¶ij
is demand of the …rms in country j for investment goods produced by a …rm i. A unit
of capital, i.e. a machine, may be assembled at zero cost in di¤erent ways from time-
varying product spaces, but once it is assembled it performes the same service. A larger
product space does not allow for more productive capital (no Smithian growth).13 Note
that we do not allow for the usual depreciation of capital. One can think of capital
as a durable composite of intermediate input goods that is permanently maintained.
The maintenance cost will show up in the …xed cost parameter ® of the production
function.
Additionally, we assume free …rm entry and exit which keeps pro…ts at zero.
Production factors are immobile.14 For simplicity, labour supply is inelastic, equally
distributed among countries, and normalized to one. Finally, there are trade costs of
12This particular type of the production function will guarantee both constancy of factor shares
(Kaldor, 1963), and constant returns to scale on industry level (Burnside, 1996).
13Smithian growth, i.e. the cost reduction from larger market size and increased specialization, is
discussed in Kelly (1997).
14We make this assumption, because we want to distinguish our agglomeration process from that
of Krugman (1991a), Krugman and Venables (1995), Venables (1996), and Martin and Ottaviano
(1996). These papers rely on interregional or intersectoral factor (in particular labour) movements
and R&D location decisions.
7the Samuelson iceberg-type, such that only a fraction ¿ of one produced unit of a good
arrives at its foreign destination (0 < ¿ < 1).
3 Equilibrium
The consumption maximization problem of the typical agents in country 1 and 2 may
be solved in two stages. First, the demand for any variety is determined for any given
time path of expenditure on consumption goods. The corresponding unit expenditure















where pj and pex
k are the domestic producer prices and export prices of …rms in country
j and k charged to consumers in country j, respectively. The solution to this problem16









where rj and wj denote nominal rental and wage rates. Investment expenditure equals
wage income and rents minus consumption expenditure. Second, the optimal con-
sumption expenditure is determined by maximizing utility (1) taking the individual
budget constraint (6), a price vector, and the initial condition as given. We assume
that private agents do not foresee the impact of their behaviour on decisions of agents
in the other country. This assumption excludes strategic interaction and is in line with








15Note that we take here the symmetry of …rms within a country into account.






17We follow the standard procedure as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
8where ½j ´ rj=Pj denotes the real rental rate of capital. Additionally, the familiar
transversality condition completes the description of the dynamical system. Note that
the steady state condition of the emerging dynamical system will involve equalization
of real rental rates of capital across countries.
Firms maximize pro…ts and use a mark-up pricing rule given the imperfect
competition conjecture of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that …rms take the direct impact
of their price decision on goods market demand into account, but not the indirect










It is important that prices for foreign consumers contain a transport-cost mark-up on
prices for domestic consumers. Furthermore, c(wj;rj) denotes the unit cost function
which is given by the following expression:







Finally, the relative input demand determines after aggregation the wage-rental ratio








Capital letters denote aggregates (e.g. Kj ´ njkj and Vj ´ njvj). Additionally, the
zero pro…t condition njpjxj = rjKj +wj holds due to free …rm entry and exit. Hence,
we …nd from the zero pro…t condition and equation (10) that the rental payments are
a constant fraction of income:
rjKj = ±njpjxj: (11)




18For a discussion of this conjecture see d’Aspremont, et. al. (1996).
19For the derivation, we use the de…nition of Vj, equations (3) and (8), and c(wj;rj)Vj = rjKj+wj
which is obtained by plugging (11) and its counterpart for labour demand into the de…nition of Vj,
deviding through by c(wj;rj), and applying the zero pro…t condition.




j = Vj: (13)
Thus, the number of …rms and goods depends on the capital stock of a country. The
goods market equilibrium condition for a typical …rm in country 1 at any point of time
is the last equilibrium condition to be imposed:21
p
¡¾
















where q ´ ¿¾¡1 proxies the reciprocal of trade costs for notational simplicity. Using the
zero pro…t condition and de…ning relative producer prices (terms of trade) p ´ p2=p1
and relative …rm agglomeration n ´ n2=n1, equation (14) can be reformulated in the
following way:
1
1 + qnp1¡¾ +
qnp
q + np1¡¾ = 1; (15)




with 0 < n < 1 (16)
This simple equation gives a relationship between the terms of trade and relative …rm
agglomeration.
De…ning K ´ K2=K1, equation (13) may be restated in the following way:
n = K
±: (17)
The degree of …rm agglomeration is determined by the relative size of capital stocks.
From now on, we can use …rm agglomeration n and relative capital stocks K inter-
changeably. Next, the relative consumption price index P (real exchange rate) of the




20All results of the model are independent of ® and ¯.
21Note that we exploit here the fact that the composition of consumption good and investment
good demand is irrelevant for goods market equilibrium, because we assumed investment and the
consumption basket to be of the same functional composite of goods.
10where we used (5) and (16). De…ne relative (nominal rental rates) r ´ r2=r1. Then,
it follows from (11), (13) and (17) that
r = pK
±¡1 (19)
The relative (nominal) rental rate depends on two factors: the relative capital stocks
and the relative producer terms of trade. Now, we can summarize the factor and goods
market equilibrium conditions in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: For 0 < K ￿ 1 holds: the correspondence p = p(K) is an upward sloping
function below 1; P = P (K) is a downward sloping function above 1; r = r(K) is
bounded from below by p(K); Finally, lim
K!0
r(K) = 1.
Proof: See appendix 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 can be shown in …gure 1 that depicts the terms of trade p(K), relative
rental rates r(K), and the relative consumption price index P (K) in dependence of
the degree of relative capital stocks K. Note additionally that relative capital stocks
K and …rm agglomeration n are proportional (equation (17)).
Figure 1 about here
If industries are partially agglomerated in country 1 (K < 1), then the terms of trade
p(K) are larger in country 1, whereas the consumption price index P (K) is smaller.
However, the relation of rental rates r(K) to relative capital stocks K may be am-
biguous.
These results re‡ect the interplay between terms of trade and agglomeration of
industries that is implicit in Krugman (1991a). Suppose, the economy starts from an
equal distribution of industries. Then, the relative distribution of production factors
changes, because one country is accumulating more capital. Consequently, there will
be more purchasing power in the larger country than in the smaller one. Because of
trade costs, demand for goods of a typical …rm is biased towards domestic …rms. This
implies that demand for goods of a typical …rm in the larger country exceeds the one
11in the smaller country. However, supply of …rms is the same across all …rms in the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework (see equation (12)). Thus, goods market clearing
requires that relative producer prices fall in the smaller country. The price movement
induces the exit of …rms in the smaller country and the entry of new …rms in the larger
(see equation (17)).
The consumption price index of a typical consumer in the large country is below
the one in the small country, although (factory gate) producer prices are higher in the
large country and a larger share of income is spent on domestic goods (See equation
(18)). This is so, because less goods have to be imported in the large country. Hence,
there are less goods a transport-cost mark-up has to be paid for. (See equation (8)).
In this sense, transport cost drive a wedge between relative (factory gate) producer
prices and relative consumption price indices.
The ambiguous impact of the distribution of the capital stock on rental rates
arises from a convergence force, i.e. capital-labour substitutability, and from an ag-
glomeration force, i.e. the terms-of-trade e¤ect due to the agglomeration of manufac-
turing industries (home-market e¤ect). The rise in the capital-labour ratio will lower
the rental rate relative to the wage rate in the country with more capital; the rise in
industrial agglomeration rises the terms of trade in the bigger country and rises the
overall factor payments in factor market equilibrium including - in particular - rental
rates (see equation (19)).
We close the model by combining the goods and factor market equilibrium
conditions and the conditions from …rm optimization with the dynamical equations
from consumer optimization. Note that the intertemporal budget constraint (6) can









where equation (12) is used and the second equality sign follows from equation (11).
We note from (5), (11), (12), and (13), and Lemma 1 that the real rental rate of capital
in a country depends on the level of the two capital stocks in the two countries K1 and
12K2 (½j ´ rj=Pj = ½j (K1;K2)). Then the model may be summarized in the following
4-dimensional, non-linear di¤erential equation system with the control variables C1






K1 ¡ C1 (21)
:





K2 ¡ C2 (23)
:
C2 = (½2(K1;K2) ¡ ¸)C2; (24)
where the transversality conditions are
lim
t!1 Kj (t)¹j (t) = 0 (25)
with the co-state variables ¹j (t) for (21) and (23), and the initial conditions are
Kj (0) = Kj0 (26)
for j = 1;2.
Next, the steady states are calculated. Combining (22) and (24) requires ½ ´
½2=½1 = r (K)=P (K) = 1 in the steady state. First, we de…ne a benchmark value q¤
for the reciprocal transport cost proxy q, such that
q
¤ ´
(2¾ ¡ 1)(±¾ + 1 ¡ ¾)
±¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)
: (27)
Then, we can formulate the following proposition on the equalization of real rental
rates of the two countries.
Proposition 1: (i) The steady state condition ½(K) = 1 has the (trivial) symmetry
solution
_
K= 1, if q > q¤; moreover, it holds that
d½(1)
dK < 0 in this case.
(ii) The steady state condition ½(K) = 1 has the solutions
_
K= fK¤;1=K¤;1g, if




dK < 0; and
d½(1=K¤)
dK < 0 in this case.
13Proof: See appendix 2.
There are two regimes depending on the level of trade costs, and one of the two
regimes has multiple equilibria. The …rst regime will be called neoclassical regime;
the second regime will be called poverty trap regime, henceforth.
Trade costs drive a wedge between relative producer prices and consumption
price indices. If this wedge widens su¢ciently (q < q¤), the intermediate solution K¤
arises (see …gure 1). In this case, an increase of the capital stock in the largest country
rises the real rental rate above the one in the smallest country in the neighborhood
of a symmetric distribution of capital (d½(1)=dK > 0). In this sense investment
projects are local complements in the poverty trap regime (spatial complementarity
of investment). If the wedge between producer prices and consumption price indices
is not su¢ciently large (q > q¤), then an increase of the capital stock in the largest
country leads to a lower real rental rate than in the smallest country (d½(1)=dK < 0).
In this sense investment projects are global substitutes in the neoclassical regime
(spatial substitutability of investment).








C2 can be obtained as functions of
_
K.22
However, we will not focus on their values. For future reference, we will denote















K= K¤ < 1 and
_
K= 1=K¤ > 1 by x¤;x¤¤; and x¤¤¤,




Finally, we shall point at two interesting properties of the model. First, the
model relies on constant factor shares which is one of the stylised facts of growth theory
(Kaldor, 1963). This is so, because free …rm entry and exit drives pro…ts to zero and
income is thus devided according to relative factor prices of labour and capital just as
in any neoclassical model.
22Bars denote steady state values of a variable. Caveat:
_
K denotes the set of all steady state
capital stocks (because there are multiple equilibria), whereas K¤ denotes a certain value for one
particular steady state capital stock.




constant returns to scale. Hence, the increasing returns to scale assumption on plant
level is in line with empirical evidence on the production technology on industry level
such as Burnside (1996). The reason is that any expansion of industrial demand is
directed entirely towards expansion of product space in the presence of love of variety,
while output of a single …rm remains constant in the presence of constant price mark-
ups and free …rm entry or exit. If …rms start produce after a rise in industry demand,
they make positive pro…ts, new …rms enter, but they produce a di¤erent variety in
a market of monopolistic competition. Taken together, any rise in industry demand
rises proportionally the number of goods. But a rise in demand comes about by a rise
in income which in turn is linear homogenous in factors by the assumptions on the
production factor basket vj (3) and the result of constant factor shares.
4 Stability Analysis
We will not follow the standard procedure of a local stability analysis as in Dockner
(1985) for 4-dimensional, non-linear di¤erential equation systems, because the Jaco-
bian of the linnearized system cannot be signed easily. Instead, we will …nd a …rst-order
approximation function for the system (21)-(24) that has (i) the same steady state val-
ues, (ii) the same Jacobian matrix at the steady state values, and (iii) the Jacobian
matrix is easily signed for any single entry. Finally, we use the fact that the qualitative
dynamic behaviour of the approximation system is equivalent to the original system.


























= ½2(K1;K2) ¡ ½1(K1;K2):
We would like to express these equations in terms of relative capital and consumption.












where we de…ned C ´ C2=C1, a1 ´
_




K2. This approximation is
entirely su¢cient to describe the behaviour of the terms of trade around the steady
state and to pin down the relation of all state variables (capital, income, and …rm
distribution) between the two countries around the steady state values.23 However,
for the approximation to be valid, we need to show that the approximation (29) is
chosen such that this system has the same steady states and the same qualitative
dynamic behaviour as the original system (28). The …rst property is easily con…rmed,
whereas the second is proven in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system (29), (21), and (22) eval-
uated at any of the steady states has the same eigenvalues as the Jacobian matrix of
the dynamical system (21)-(24).
Proof: See appendix 3. Q.E.D.
This lemma will be used for the local stability analysis that is summarized in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2: Consider the dynamical system (21)-(26). Assume that the eigenval-
ues are distinct. Then, this system is locally asymptotically stable if either
(i) q > q¤ and
_
K= 1 or
(ii) q < q¤ and
_
K= K¤ or
(iii) q < q¤ and
_
K= 1=K¤.
23To recover the absolute values of the state variables, two more equations are necessary: e.g. the
dynamical equations governing country 1. We skip them to focus on the idea of the solution method,
but use them in the rigorous mathematical derivation in Lemma 2 and appendix 3.
16Furthermore, there exist three corresponding two-dimensional local stable manifolds
W s
loc (x¤); W s
loc (x¤¤); and W s
loc (x¤¤¤). On the contrary, the dynamical system (21)-
(26) has a one-dimensional local stable manifold W s
loc (x¤), if
(iv) q < q¤ and
_
K= 1.
This local stable manifold is described by K1(t) = K2(t) and C1 (t) = C2(t) for
0 ￿ t ￿ 1.
Proof: See appendix 4.
Proposition 2 resembles a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation with the bifurca-
tion parameter q and the bifurcation point q = q¤: We illustrate this in the following
bifurcation diagram.
Figure 2 about here
The vertical axes shows the position of steady state equilibria in terms of the relative
distribution of capital; the horizontal axes shows the level of trade costs. At a high
level of trade costs (low q), there are three steady states with the symmetric one
(
_
K= 1) being unstable (poverty trap regime). At a low level of trade costs (high q),
there is only one stable steady state equilibrium at a symmetric distribution of capital
(neoclassical regime).
The poverty trap regime emerges if and only if investment projects become
locally complementary in the neighborhood of a symmetric distribution of capital and
…rms.24;25 Around a symmetric distribution of capital, an increase of investment in
one country relative to the other increases, rather than decreases, the relative real
marginal productivity of capital in terms of the consumer price indices inducing more
investment to take place in the former than in the latter country. At some degree of
divergence in capital stocks and …rm distribution the divergence process stops, because
investment projects have become locally substitutes. A further rise of investment in
24This follows immediately from the proof of proposition 2 in appendix 4, equations (71)-(74).
25Note that investment complementarity occurs endogenously in the model, whenever trade cost
are relatively low, as has been explained after proposition 1 in the text. It is not required that
production factors are complements.
17the booming country lowers the real marginal productivity of capital relative to the
declining country. Therefore the divergence process remains incomplete and a certain
asymmetric distribution of capital and …rms is a stable equilibrium.
The neoclassical regime emerges on the contrary, if investment projects are
globally substitutes, i.e. a relative rise in investment of one country above investment
in the other lowers the real marginal product of capital in the former relative to the
latter country. Therefore, only the symmetric distribution of capital can be a stable
steady state. Given that there can exist multiple stable local manifolds, it is important
to examine one aspect of global stability.
Proposition 3: Consider the dynamical system (21)-(26) and the case q < q¤: For any
given combination of initial conditions K10;K20 2 R+, there exists a unique perfect
foresight path for the two control variables C1 and C2. Furthermore, x¤ is approached,
if K10 = K20; x¤¤ is approached, if K10 > K20; x¤¤¤ is approached, if K10 < K20;
Proof: See appendix 5. Q.E.D.
This proposition ensures that there exists a unique perfect-foresight path. Only
one of the three steady states can be reached for any given combination of initial condi-
tions. Therefore, this model does not exhibit expectations-driven agglomeration pro-
cesses as have been found in other dynamic models with increasing returns to scale like
Matsuyama (1991), Krugman (1991b), and Kaneda (1995). In particular, we do not
need any additional coordination mechanism of expectations as Kaneda’s (1995) as-
sumption of “euphoric expectations” to select among multiple perfect-foresight paths.
4.1 The Neoclassical Growth Regime
In this section we discuss in detail the neoclassical regime, i.e. the case where trade
costs are relatively low (q > q¤). Recall that there is one steady state distribution of
capital
_
K= 1. We summarize our results:
18Result 1: The neoclassical regime (q > q¤) exhibits outphasing growth and conver-
gence of income.26
The dynamic adjustment path is shown in …gure 3.
Figure 3 about here
The …gure shows the unique stable manifold of the 4 dimensional di¤erential equation
system (21)-(26). In particular, there is a unique mapping from the state space
K2 ¡K1 to the control variable space C2 ¡C1 which follows from the stable manifold
theorem (see proposition 2). Even if two structurally identical countries start out with
dissimilar capital stocks, i.e. one country is poor and the other is rich, there will be
convergence of capital stocks and per capita income. The poorer country will grow
faster than the richer country in the transition period to the steady state.
Our neoclassical growth regime di¤ers from, e.g., a Solow or a Ramsey model
(without technological progress and population growth) by a di¤erent adjustment
path. Thus, countries that catch up do not follow the same path as the leading
countries. History does not repeat, as is the case in the Solow and Ramsey model.
Once some country is ahead, the catch-up process will change terms of trade and the
real marginal product of capital. This will foster income growth of the country lacking
behind beyond what is predicted by a model with two isolated Ramsey economies. In
this sense, the speed of convergence is higher in our neoclassical regime than in the
isolated Ramsey economies.
Furthermore, our model predicts that trade-liberalization triggers aconvergence
process eliminating poverty traps, if q passes the threshold q¤. This adds qualitatively
a new dimension to the relation between trade openness and growth convergence. The
bifurcation property of trade liberalization is in line with the …nding of Ben-David
(1993) who shows: 1) There is absolute convergence of income in an economy with
26This follows from proposition 2: the steady state is stable and the relative capital stock approaches
one. However, income is a monotone, increasing function of the capital stock.
19trade liberalization (EEC627 from 1959-1968, EEC328 after the mid-sixties, USA and
Canada after the Kennedy Round Agreement), or with trade and factor market in-
tegration (the convergence of the US states). 2) There is no absolute convergence of
economies that are not integrated (e.g. the EEC6 and the EEC3 before trade liber-
alization, the 25 most developed countries, or the “whole world”).29 Therefore, this
evidence points to a two regime scenario with trade liberalization being the bifurcation
parameter as suggested by our model.30
The factor price equalization (FPE) theorem of international trade may also ex-
plain income convergence after trade liberalization. However, Slaughter (1997) points
out for the case of the EEC3 of Ben-David (1993): “... the post-accession per-worker
income convergence was driven at least partly by post-accession per-worker capital-
stock convergence. The FPE theorem is about trade changing factor prices, not factor
quantities.” (Slaughter, 1997, p. 198.) Our explanation combines both factor price
and factor quantity convergence and our model also re‡ects the convergence of the cap-
ital stocks, in particular. Levine and Renelt (1992) show additionally that the impact
of openness on growth stems from investment promotion, and not from productivity
growth.31
4.2 The Poverty Trap Regime
In this section, we discuss in detail the poverty-trap regime, i.e. the case where trade
costs are relatively high (q < q¤). Recall that there are three steady state distributions
of capital, one of which is unstable. We summarize our results:
27This is the group of countries consisting of France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and Italy.
28This is the group of countries consisting of Denmark, Ireland, and UK.
29If there is conditional convergence among the EEC6 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), but not
absolute convergence, then factors other than capital accumulation must drive income convergence.
If trade liberalization causes absolute convergence, then trade liberalization must have caused a
catch-up in capital stocks. This is the transmission channel in our model.
30The role of trade openness as bifurcation parameter may be reversed, if di¤erent convergence
forces are chosen (see section 4.3). Rauch (1997) gives the examples of Chile 1974-79 and of Italy’s
political uni…cation 1861, and explains the subsequent economic slumps in an endogenous growth
model.
31Lee (1995) provides a theory and evidence that the convergence source of trade liberalization is
trade in capital goods.
20Result 2: In the poverty trap regime (q < q¤), income levels tend to diverge mono-
tonically up to some relative ratio Y ¤ = K¤±, if country 2 is taken to be the smaller
country.32
The poverty trap case is graphically exposed in …gure 4 which is drawn in line
with propositions 2 and 3. The …gure shows the map of the state space (initial capital
distribution) on the control variable space (consumption choices) belonging to the
three local stable manifolds W s
loc (x¤); W s
loc (x¤¤); and W s
loc (x¤¤¤) which are related to
the three steady-state vectors x¤; x¤¤, and x¤¤¤, respectively.
Figure 4 about here
Proposition 3 ensures that, for K1(0) = K2(0); consumption is chosen in line with
the stable manifold Ws
loc (x¤) that leads to the symmetric steady state x¤; if K1(0) >
K2(0); consumption is chosen in line with the stable manifold W s
loc (x¤¤) that leads to
the steady state x¤¤ with more capital in country 1; if K1(0) < K2(0); consumption
is chosen in line with the stable manifold W s
loc (x¤¤¤) that leads to the steady state
x¤¤¤ with more capital in country 2. Because W s
loc (x¤) is one-dimensional, any slight
disturbance of this symmetric growth path, in the sense that one country accumulates
more capital at some time period (idiosyncratic shock), will leave the symmetric steady
state unachievable. Capital stocks and income will diverge governed by one of the
other two stable manifolds depending on which country received a positive or negative
idiosyncratic shock.33
The recent empirical convergence literature is inconclusive of the (conditional)
convergence hypothesis (Barro, 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil, 1992) or the club convergence hypothesis (Baumol, et. al., 1989,
Durlauf and Johnson, 1995, and Quah, 1996) for both country and regional data sets.
On the one hand, Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Mankiw, Romer
32The statement follows from proposition 2 that shows the divergence of the capital stocks and
from the fact that national income is a monotonous function of capital.
33We cannot accomplish a global dynamic analysis, but numerical simulations suggest that a typical
divergence path would stay close to the symmetric growth path for a long time after an idiosyncratic
shock has occured and will eventually lead to a drastic relative and absolute decline in the country
that was originally hit.
21and Weil (1992) …nd that the average country or region converges conditionally on
structural characteristics of the economies. On the other hand, Quah (1996) notes
that the population of the converging regions/countries might be double peaked, thus
supporting the club convergence hypothesis which says that initial conditions also
matter. Additionally, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) reject the conditional convergence
hypothesis in favour of multiple regimes or stages of development in a cross section
analysis. Quah (1996) notes also that conditional convergence of the average country
in a regression analysis is compatible with outlier countries that do not converge.34
A wide range of poverty trap models is at hand35 to explain the prevalence of
any sort of income divergence among some countries. Our model can be distinguished
from most of the poverty trap models in a growth setting by explaining income di-
vergence of two countries even though initial conditions are the same except for an
idiosyncratic shock. In other words, the ratio of initial conditions matters, not the
initial conditions themselves.
This has two implications. First, poverty trap models where absolute values
of initial conditions matter36 have di¢culties explaining how the rich countries left
the poverty trap, whereas the poor countries did not, if all countries started from
roughly the same income levels, say in the 17th/18th century.37 Our model allows
some countries to become rich, and others, that are hit by some negative idiosyncratic
shock, stay poor.
Second, our model is especially suited for explaining the fall-back of highly
developed countries like the United Kingdom after the turn of the century relative
to countries that had initially the same state of development. Our model catches
the following stylized facts: 1) “The weakness of manufacturing industry is certainly
34The classical example is the Italian Mezzogiorno - a region of relative and absolute decline over
decades. See Rauch (1997).
35A survey of these poverty trap models can be found in Azariadis (1996).
36These are the poverty trap models corresponding to the club convergence hypothesis. A de…nition
and an overview of convergence hypotheses is given by Galor (1996).
37“The very fact that the world at present is so sharply divided between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries
is, in the context of the broad sweep of history, something relatively new: it is the cumulative result
of the historical experience of two or three hundred years. If we go back a few hundred years for
example, to 1700 or 1750, we do not …nd, as far as we can tell, such large di¤erences in real income
per capita between di¤erent countries or regions.” Kaldor (1967, p.3)
22the main reason why the UK has become a relatively poor country and why per capita
incomes in the UK are now the lowest in Northern Europe.” (Rowthorn and Wells,
1987, p. 224.) Kitson and Michie (1996) report that average manufacturing output
in the UK grew 1.5 % from 1964 until 1989 compared to 3.9 % in the US and 2.7 %
in Germany. 2) A dominant source of this weakness is the lack of capital formation.
Average capital stock growth of the UK is 2.9 % compared to 3.9 % in Germany
and 4 % in the US during the period from 1963 until 1982 (see Dollar and Wol¤,
1993). Bean and Crafts (1995) demonstrate on the basis of Levine and Renelts (1992)
growth regression results that the shortage of UK capital formation accounts for 0.55
percentage points of a total of 1.63 percentage points growth shortfall, whereas the
lack of education accounts for only 0.08 percentage points.38
There is still one observation to be made concerning the terms of trade which
distinguishes our model from the other geography and trade models listed in the
introduction and other dynamic trade models such as Osang and Pereira (1997).
Result 3: In the poverty trap regime (q < q¤), there is a worsening of the terms of
trade p(t) over time in the country that lags behind vis a vis the country that is ahead,
where terms of trade are de…ned in fob-manufacturing-producer prices.39
There has been an extensive discussion in the 50ies, whether developing coun-
tries faced a persistent worsening of their terms of trade.40 Although - strictly speaking
- our model is only suitable for developing countries whose export goods are produced
with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition41, our model suggests
that a worsening of the terms of trade was in principle explicable, whenever invest-
ment projects were locally complements and capital accumulation was poor.42 Our
38However, there is also evidence by Edgerton (1996) for a lack of R&D.
39Suppose country 2 lags behind. From proposition 2 follows that the relative capital stock K (t)
approaches assymptotically K¤ < 1. From numerical simulations can be inferred that K (t) changes
monotonically. From Lemma 1 follows that p(t) is monotonically increasing with K (t). Therefore,
the time path for p(t) has the same qualitative properties as the time path for K (t):
40An empirical survey is Spraos (1980).
41Spraos (1980) indicates: “Perhaps more important than any of these is the processing of primary
products before shipment (for instance, cocoa beans turned into cocoa butter and cocoa paste) which
has been increasing all the time, though in developing countries it had gained great momentum only
in the last twenty years.” (p. 118) Additionally, mining and agro-business may not a priori be less
likely described by increasing returns to scale than manufacturing industries.
42Of course, we do not doubt that other explanations can be found. We just want to point out that
23model suggests that the appropriate policy meassure was not to close national mar-
kets (import substitution) despite that trade seemed to harm developing countries,
but to open national markets in order to eliminate the underlying poverty trap - a
recommendation that …nds broad consensus nowadays.
4.3 Economic Geography
Having shown the interdependence between real marginal product of capital, capital
accumulation, and terms of trade, we focus now on the aspect of agglomeration of
manufacturing industries. From the analysis so far, it follows immediately (by equation
(17)) that the faster growth in the country with more capital causes a larger number of
…rms which we take as a proxy for manufacturing industry agglomeration. A relative
increase in domestic capital increases domestic income, which in turn increases demand
for any existing domestic variety. The latter increases domestic producer prices relative
to foreign (terms-of-trade e¤ect), which leads to positive pro…ts of domestic …rms and
thus the entry of new domestic …rms.
Result 4: At high trade costs (q < q¤), there will be partial agglomeration of manu-
facturing industries in one country.43
Hence, a low growth rate is associated with a decline of manufacturing indus-
tries. Indeed, slower growth and a decline of manufacturing industries self-enforce
each other in a cumulative process.44 Conversely, agglomeration of manufacturing
industries is explained by faster capital accumulation in one country relative to an-
other. This explanation di¤ers from other explanations in papers on agglomeration
and growth - as Bertola (1992), Englmann and Walz (1995), and Martin and Ottaviano
(1996). In these papers, agglomeration processes in growth models rely on migration,
capital ‡ows with technological spill-overs, and R&D location decisions.
The role of trade costs for triggering agglomeration is reversed compared to
the terms of trade e¤ect in our poverty trap regime does not run counter to the empirical literature.
43This follows from result 2 and from equation (17).
44The notion of a cumulative process was introduced to economics by Myrdal (1957).
24Krugman (1991a). This is so, because we exchanged the convergence forces. Krug-
man’s (1991a) convergence force is based on ambiguous terms-of-trade e¤ects caused
by an immobile farming sector. As trade costs increase from a very low level, terms
of trade increase in the larger country. (We observed the same e¤ect in our model.)
However, as trade costs increase further in Krugman (1991a), terms of trade may
start to decrease. This e¤ect is not present in our model. Instead, increasing trade
costincrease the wedge between relative producer prices and relative consumption price
indices which in turn icreases the possibility of a poverty trap. We conclude there-
fore that the role of trade costs is not robust with respect to the speci…c convergence
force used in geography and trade models. A similar result to ours is obtained by
Puga (1999) in an economic geography model. The latter model assumes land-labour
substitutability of the constant returns to scale good instead of capital-labour substi-
tutability in manufacturing.
5 Dynamic Welfare Gains of Trade Liberalization
This section asks the following questions on the welfare implications of the model: Does
the country that is about to become stuck in a poverty trap have a lower intertemporal
welfare than the country that is forging ahead? Suppose a country is about to become
stuck in a poverty trap and income is diverging. Will there be a welfare gain of
trade liberalization (i.e., a reduction in trade barriers), if the regime switches from the
poverty trap to the neoclassical one, and income divergence is turned into convergence?
Will this welfare gain go beyond the one known from Baldwin (1992)?
We …rst explore, whether the “large” country is better o¤ in the poverty trap
regime (q < q¤) approaching the large-country steady state than the “small” country
approaching the small-country steady state.45 Without loss of generality, let country
2 be the slightly smaller country (i.e., K10 = K20 + "; " > 0; " ¡! 0). Hence, the
considered steady state will be x¤¤ in …gure 4. We de…ne U¤¤
j (q) as the intertemporal
45A country is de…ned to be “larger” than another, if its initial capital stock (per capita) is larger.
25welfare level of country j following the optimal trajectory from the intitial condition









j (t;q)dt; j = 1;2; (30)
where C¤¤
j (t;q) is the period t consumption level of country j on the optimal trajectory
towards steady state x¤¤ at a given q. Then, we …nd the following proposition:
Proposition 4: In the poverty trap regime, the country that is about to become stuck
in the poverty trap (country 2) will experience a lower intertemporal welfare than the
country that is forging ahead. Formally, U¤¤
2 (q) < U¤¤
1 (q); if, K10 = K20 + "; " > 0;
" ¡! 0; and a q is given with q < q¤.
Proof: See appendix 6. Q.E.D.
The “small” country does not only have less accumulation of capital, less man-
ufacturing …rms, and a smaller variety of domestically produced goods, but it also has
a lower welfare level than the “large” country. This result does not only hold for the
steady state, but also for the transition path of two countries with (almost) the same
initial conditions and the same structural characteristics. Thus, a very small shock
may cause a large intertemporal welfare gain or loss.
The intuition for this result is straight forward: the country that approaches the
large-country steady state experiences a persistent improvement of its terms of trade,
whereas the country that approaches the small-country steady state experiences a
deterioration. Hence, the large country can a¤ord to consume more goods over time,
whereas the small country can a¤ord to consume less (direct e¤ect). Additionally,
the large country has a larger real return on investment in the face of this terms of
trade trend and chooses to accumulate more capital than the small country. This
accumulation e¤ect also increases the feasible budget set from which the large country
makes its consumption and investment choice (indirect e¤ect).
Second, we address the question whether a switch from a diverging growth path
26to a symmetric growth path improves welfare in the neoclassical regime, if 2 countries
start from (almost) the same initial condition. We de…ne U¤
2 (q) as the welfare level
of country 2 at a given trade cost q according to equation (1), if consumption follows
an optimal trajectory from some initial condition K10 = K20 towards the symmetric
steady state x¤ that is depicted in …gures 3 and 4. Hence, U¤
2 (q) is the maximal
welfare of country 2, if the two countries grow identical. Then, the proposition holds:
Proposition 5: Suppose two countries face the same initial capital stocks (up to
some in…nitesimally small idiosyncratic shock) in the poverty trap regime. Then, the
country on the diverging growth path towards a small-country steady state (country
2) can increase its welfare, if it manages to switch to a symmetric growth path with
identical steady states for both countries. Formally, U¤¤
2 (q) < U¤
2 (q); if K10 t K20;
and a q is given with q < q¤.
Proof: See appendix 7. Q.E.D.
The reason is again the di¤erent time path of the terms of trade in the two
cases. Whereas there is no change in the terms of trade on the symmetric growth path
towards the steady state x¤, there is a deterioration of the terms of trade of the country
on the diverging growth path towards the small-country steady state x¤¤. Again, the
direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect apply: 1) the consumption basket becomes ever
more expensive on the diverging growth path and less consumption is a¤ordable. 2)
Capital accumulation is smaller on the diverging growth path and the period budget
constraint grows slower over time.
Finally, we consider the following thought experiment: Suppose two countries
are (almost) identical, but country 2 is expecting to be on a diverging growth path
towards the small-country steady state x¤¤. What is its welfare gain of a reduction of
trade cost, say from q to q0, if this reduction is su¢cient to switch the regime from
the poverty trap to the neoclassical one (q < q¤ < q
0)? The resulting welfare gain
can be split into two parts: …rst, the welfare gain from a divergent growth path to
a symmetric one at the same trade cost level (U¤
2 (q) ¡ U¤¤
2 (q)); second, the welfare
27gain from a reduction of trade cost on a symmetric growth path (U¤
2 (q0) ¡ U¤
2 (q)).
The …rst source of a welfare gain is dealt with in proposition 5. The second source of
a welfare gain is explored in Baldwin (1992). According to the latter study, there is
a static welfare gain due to cheaper access to foreign goods. There is also a dynamic
welfare gain, because trade liberalization increases capital accumulation which is too
low in the presence of monopoly pricing.
Thus the welfare gain due to a jump out of a poverty trap (as in proposition
5) is a new source of a dynamic welfare gain of trade liberalization additionally to
Baldwin (1992). This dynamic welfare gain is likely to be large, because it is not just
caused by a marginal re-allocation of factors, but by choosing a completely di¤erent
time trajectory. Such a dynamic welfare gain will be present, whenever there is a
structural break in an investment time series after trade liberalization.
6 Conclusion
We built a model that explains income divergence in a poverty trap regime, income
convergence in a neoclassical regime, and a testable condition under which a country
is in one or the other regime. This condition depends on the degree of integration
in product markets. If trade barriers are high, income divergence is likely to occur.
If trade barriers are low, income convergence is the unique equilibrium. Thus, trade
liberalization may trigger a catch-up process of countries that are stuck in a poverty
trap.
The interrelation of growth and agglomeration is described by circular causa-
tion. Countries grow faster (slower), because they have a lot of (a few) manufacturing
industries. Countries have a lot of (a few) manufacturing industries, because they have
grown faster (slower) in the past and thereby accumulated more (less) capital. The cir-
cular causation relies on a terms-of-trade e¤ect that may or may not feed back on real
rental rates (spatial complementarity or substitutability of investment). The countries
stuck in the poverty trap experience slower growth, a lower investment-to-GDP ratio,
28a worsening of their terms of trade, and a decline in manufacturing industries. The
countries that catch up experience a higher growth rate, a higher investment-to-GDP
ratio, an improvement of their terms of trade, and manufacturing industries di¤use to
the poor country.
The country that is about to become stuck in a poverty trap experiences a lower
welfare than the country that is forging ahead. A country that is about to become
stuck in a poverty trap can gain by trade liberalization, since this may turn the process
of income divergence into a process of income convergence. Such a dynamic welfare
gain of trade liberalization due to a jump out of a poverty trap is additional to the
welfare gains explored in Baldwin (1992).
The results in this paper have been derived in a speci…c model set-up - increas-
ing returns and monopolistic competition. Following the same sort of argument as
Gali (1994) for a closed economy, the pitchfork-bifurcation property may also appear
in a set-up with Cournot oligopoly. Our analysis suggests that divergence of income
and …rm agglomeration emerge, whenever investment projects are complementary in
the neighborhood of a symmetric distribution of capital and …rms.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1.




¡¾p¾ (q ¡ p¡¾) ¡ (q ¡ p¾)(q ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)p¡¾)
p2(q ¡ p¡¾)
2 (31)
with 0 < n < 1: (a) Suppose p > 1, then q ¡p¾ < 0. Therefore, q ¡ p¡¾ < 0 for n to
be positive by inspection of (16). Then follows by inspection of (31) that dn=dp > 0,
because ¾ > 1 by assumption. (b) Suppose p < 1, then q ¡ p¡¾ < 0. Therefore,
q ¡ p¾ < 0 for n to be positive by inspection of (16). Then follows by inspection
of (31) that dn=dp > 0, because ¾ > 1 by assumption. This implies that the invers
function exists in the positive range. From (17) follows that K and n are proportional.
Hence, we have that p(K) is an invertible function and dp=dK > 0. P (K) must then
be downward sloping from (18). From (19) follows that r(K) is bounded from below
by p(K). Finally, the limit with respect to complete agglomeration (K ! 0) can be
taken from (19). Q.E.D.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1.
We will …rst show that there are at most 3 solutions to ½(K) ´ r(K)=P (K) = 1.





1¡¾ = 1: (32)
















(1¡¾)(1¡±) = 0: (34)
This expression has at most 3 solutions for p due to Descartes’ Rule of Sign. Because
there is a one-to-one mapping from p to n to K (Lemma 1), there correspond at
most three values for n and K. We conclude: one solution is K = 1 (The symmetry
solution is always true.); if there is a second solution K¤ < 1, then the third must be
(1=K¤) > 1 because of the symmetry of the model.
Now, we will give a necessary and su¢cient condition for the existence of K¤ by
restricting our view on 0 < K ￿ 1. Recall from Lemma 1: lim
K!0
r (K) = 1, whereas








There will exist the interior solution K¤, if ½(K) < 1 for K slightly below 1 (interme-
diate value theorem). This is not just a necessary condition for the existence of K¤,
but also a su¢cient condition for K¤ to be the only interior solution (0 < K¤ < 1),
because ½(1) = 1. (Suppose on the contrary that K¤ exists and ½(K) > 1; when
K is slightly below 1, then there will exist at least two interior solutions (or none)
for 0 < K < 1 which contradicts our …ndings above.) From (17) follows that there
34corresponds a n¤ = K¤±: We can formulate the necessary and su¢cient condition for























1 ¡ 2¾ ¡ q
: (38)


























Using (38) and (40) in (36) yields an inequality
q ¡ 1







which can be solved for q:
q < q
¤ ´
(2¾ ¡ 1)(±¾ + 1 ¡ ¾)
±¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)
< 1: (42)
A similar argumentation holds for 1=n¤ and 1 ￿ n < 1, i.e. 1=K¤ and 1 ￿ K < 1,
by the symmetry property of the model.
Finally, the derivative in (i) follows from ½(1) = 1; ½(K) > 1, if K < 1; and ½(K) < 1,
if K > 1. Correspondingly, the derivatives in (ii) follow from ½(1) = ½(K¤) = 1; and
½(K) > 1, if K < K¤ or K > 1=K¤; ½(K) < 1, if 1 > K > K¤ or 1=K¤ > K > 1.
(See Lemma 1). Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 2.
Let x ´ (K1;C1;K2;C2) and the dynamical system (21)-(24) be written in matrix
notation as
:







± ln½(K) ¡ a2lnC + a2lnK
v
½1(K1;K)
± K1 ¡ C1 ³
v
























½1 =@K1 < 0, which follows from (5), (11), (12), and (13).46 De…ne the














1 0 0 0















































A ´ y; (46)
where we used the …rst-order Taylor expansions





































around the steady state vector
_
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; (48)
























































































dx can be found from the linnearization of the
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(57)























for j = 1;2, which follows from the steady state conditions of (21) and (23). Now, we








dy are similar matrices.47
Therefore, we need one more preliminary calculation. From the chain rule of matrix


























































where the …rst equality sign follows from (61), the second equality sign follows from
(58), and the second identity follows from the de…nition of A. Therefore, the matrices
47De…nition: If A and B are square matrices, we say that B is similar to A, if there is an invertible
matrix h such that B = hAh¡1. (Brock and Malliaris, 1989, p.349)
37A and B are similar. However, two similar square matrices A and B have the same
characteristic polynomials and eigenvalues (Theorem 4.1 in Brock and Malliaris, 1989,
p.349), i.e.
jA ¡ ³I4j = jB ¡ ³I4j = 0: (63)
where ³ denotes the eigenvector and I4 the 4 £ 4 identity matrix. This concludes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2.













dy and g(y) is de…ned in equation (43) of
appendix 3. The characteristic polynomial of the matrix B reads:
jB ¡ ³I4j =















































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= 0; (65)
where ³ denotes the eigenvector and I4 the 4 £ 4 identity matrix. Next, a Gauss-
transformation with the Pivot-elements (1,1) and (3,4) is undertaken and the second
column is changed with the …rst to form a matrix in Gauss-form.
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯








K +a2 ¡ ³ ¡a2 0 0











































































Because the determinant of a matrix in Gauss form is the product of its diagonal

























































































































½1 =@K1 < 0, the last two eigenvalues are real numbers and can be ranked
as follows:
³3 < 0 < ³4: (70)
The …rst two eigenvalues are evaluated as follows:
















Note that condition (72) is ful…lled in cases (i), (ii), and (iii) of proposition 2, whereas
condition (74) is equivalent to the condition described in case (iv) of proposition 2
which follows from proposition 1.
Because the matrices A and B have the same characteristic polynomials (Lemma 2),
the qualitative local stability properties are preserved by the transformation from the
linnearization of system (64) to the linnearization of system (21)-(24). In particular,
there exist two positive and two negative eigenvalues for system (21)-(24) in the cases
(i), (ii), and (iii) of proposition 2 and 3 positive and 1 negative eigenvalue in case (iv).
There correspond stable (unstable) eigenvectors to the stable (unstable) eigenvalues.
By the stable manifold theorem, the local stable manifolds for the local steady states
x¤;x¤¤; and x¤¤¤ of cases (i), (ii), and (iii) are two-dimensional (i.e. a surface in R4),
whereas the local stable manifold for x¤ in case (iv) is one-dimensional.
Next, it follows from case 1 in Buiter (1984) that a unique solution to the boundary
value problem (21)-(26) exists and is stable in cases (i), (ii), and (iii), because the
number of positive eigenvalues is equal to the number of control (jump-) variables
(C1;C2).
The boundary value problem (21)-(26) does not have a solution in case (iv), unless
we give up one initial condition. Giving up the initial condition for K2 (0) = K20 and
letting K2 “jump”, yields again a unique and stable solution. If we inspect (68), we
see that these are the eigenvalues of the dynamical subsystem (29) which determines
convergence/non-convergence of K towards the steady state
_
K. If these eigenvalues
are both positive, there will not be convergence of K. Therefore, we guess that the
system (21)-(26) must be restricted in K2(0), such that relative capital ratios are in
their steady state right from the beginning. Formally, we guess that
K1(0) = K2(0) = ￿ (75)
39will have to hold for any ￿2 R+. For any time
s
t, there exists a
s







￿: By the property of autonomous di¤erential equation systems,
s
t can be
normalized to zero. Therefore, (75) implies that
K1(t) = K2(t) (76)
for t ¸ 0. From the …rst equation of (28) follows then that
C1(t) = C2(t) (77)
for t ¸ 0: Furthermore, from (16), (17), and (76) follows that p(t) = 1 for t ¸ 0: The
system (21)-(24) collapses to two independent neoclassical growth models. Therefore,
the guess (75) is valid and yields indeed a stable solution to the boundary value
problem (21)-(26) without the initial condition K2(0) = K20. Q.E.D.
Appendix 5: Proof of proposition 3.
We start out with equations (21) and (23). They can be integrated taken Cj (0), and
½j (t) to be well-de…ned (though unknown) functions of time t as given. (Note: Cj (0)
is to be solved for.)















where we made use of the intitial condition (25) and the transversality condition (26).
Plugging (78) into (79) yields:


















(The three steps are standard in the literature, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995),
p. 59¤., in a similar model.) Suppose now





￿2 R+. Suppose further that with this initial condition the steady state x¤¤








K= K¤ < 1: Finally, we assume without loss of generality that K (0) ￿ K (s) ￿
K¤ for 0 ￿ s ￿ 1.48 From this assumption and proposition 1 follows that
½1(s) ¸ ½2(s) (81)
48In other words: If K1 (s) = K2 (s) for s 2 fs0;s00;:::g, and s0 ¸ s00 ¸ ::: on the same trajectory
reaching x¤¤ (if it exists), then we normalize by the property of autonomous systems s0 = 0. Then
follows that K1 (s) > K2 (s) ;i.e. K (s) < 1, for s > 0, because s = 0 is the last point in time, where
K1 (s) = K2 (s) is sustained and before the steady state K¤ < 1 is reached. Furthermore, x¤¤ is a
stable node which follows from the proof of proposition 2. Therefore, the steady state value is not
“overshooted” (as would be the case for a stable focus), i.e. K (s) ¸ K¤ for s > 0.










½2(s) + ¸ (82)
































and therefore by equation (80) and assumption (i)
C1(0) > C2(0): (84)







K (0) > 0. Recall that K (0) = 1 (assumption i) and K¤ < 1. Therefore, the
direction of movement will always point away from the steady state K¤, if K (0) = 1:
By the properties of an autonomous di¤erential equation system, the trajectory to the
steady state can never pass the threshold K = 1 at any point in time in the direction of
the steady state and therefore not reach the steady state. This contradicts assumption
(ii). Therefore, there is no perfect foresight path from the initial condition K (0) ¸ 1
to the steady state K¤: By the symmetry property of the model, there is also no perfect
foresight path from the initial condition K (0) ￿ 1 to the steady state (1=K¤): From
proposition 2 case (iv) follows that there exists a one-dimensional stable manifold such
that
_
K= 1 is reached, if K (0) = 1. This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 4.
A su¢cient condition for U¤¤
2 (q) < U¤¤
1 (q) is that
C
¤¤
2 (t;q) < C
¤¤
1 (t;q); 0 ￿ t ￿ 1 (86)
(see equation 30). C¤¤
j (t;q); j = 1;2; is given analogously by equation (80) in appendix
5. From (81)-(84) of appendix 5 follows analogously that a set of su¢cient conditions
for (86) are
K2t < K1t; 0 ￿ t ￿ 1 (87)
and
½2t < ½1t; 0 ￿ t ￿ 1: (88)
Condition (87) follows from the properties of the poverty trap regime as has been found
in proposition 3. If (87) holds, then (88) holds in the poverty trap regime (q < q¤) by
Lemma 1. Hence, U¤¤
2 (q) < U¤¤
1 (q); for q < q¤. Q.E.D.
Appendix 7: Proof of Proposition 5.
We …rst de…ne p¤¤(t;q); and n¤¤(t;q) as the trajectory of the ratio of producer prices
of country 2 relative to country 1, and the ratio of the number of …rms of country 2
relative to country 1 from a given initial condition K10 t K20 towards the steady state
x¤¤, respectively. Correspondingly, we de…ne p¤(t;q); and n¤(t;q) as the trajectory
of the ratio of producer prices of country 2 relative to country 1, and the ratio of
the number of …rms of country 2 relative to country 1 from a given initial condition
41K10 t K20 towards the steady state x¤, respectively. Finally, we de…ne ¼¤
2(t;q) and
¼¤¤
2 (t;q) as the trajectories of the ratio of the producer price of country 2 relative to
the consumption price index of country 2, if steady state x¤ and x¤¤ are approached,
respectively. Then, we can formulate a useful lemma.
Lemma 2: ¼¤
2(t;q) > ¼¤¤
2 (t;q); 0 ￿ t ￿ 1; for a given q, q < q¤; and a given initial
condition, K10 t K20.
Proof: First, note that
n
¤¤(t;q) < 1 (89)
for all t and a given q < q¤ by proposition 3 and
p
¤¤(t;q) < 1 (90)





































Next, we take the partial derivative of this newly de…ned function with respect to the























2 (1;t;q) = ¼¤

























Now, we are ready to begin the proof for proposition 5.
Begin of Proof:
Fix a q; q < q¤. Then, there exists an equivalent optimization problem to
(21)-(26) yielding the same trajectory for consumption in country 2, C¤
2 (t;q); in the
symmetry growth regime approaching steady state x¤, if (1) is maximized with respect







2 ¡ C2; (98)
where the time index is suppressed whenever obvious and ¼¤
2(t;q) is de…ned on top of
appendix 7.
Analogously, there exists an equivalent optimization problem to (21)-(26) yield-
ing the same trajectory for consumption in country 2, C¤¤
2 (t;q); in the poverty trap
regime approaching steady state x¤¤, if (1) is maximized with respect to C2t, subject







2 ¡ C2; (99)
where ¼¤¤
2 (t;q) is de…ned on top of appendix 7. Then, de…ne a sub-optimal consump-
tion path
^
C2 (t;q) in the symmetry growth case such that
^















2 (t;q) are the optimal trajectory of the capital stock of
country 2 in the poverty trap case approaching the steady state x¤¤, and its time
derivative, respectively. It holds that
^
C2 (t;q) ¡ C
¤¤







± > 0; 0 ￿ t ￿ 1; (101)




















C2 (t;q) and K¤¤
2 (t;q) are feasible for the program (1), (25), (26),
and (98) by construction of
^
C2 (t;q) in de…nition (100). However, these trajectories
are not optimal for this program, because K¤¤
2 (t;q) 6= K¤
2 (t;q) for at least t = 1, and
because there exists only one optimal perfect foresight path for a given set of initial
conditions and a given q by proposition 3. Hence, it must be true that
^
U2 (q) < U
¤
2 (q): (103)
Finally, it follows from (102) and (103) that
U
¤¤
2 (q) < U
¤
2 (q): (104)
q.e.d.
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